Despite this great concession to Taylor, he still refused to end the war. It was for a number of reasons. Although this peace agreement moved closer to the NPFL`s central requirement to regulate political power during the transition period, it could not satisfy Taylor`s ultimate desire to lead the transitional government. For this reason, the NPFL has declared itself ready to participate in the transitional government and further undermine the peace process. This strategy was also influenced by the fact that Burkina Faso and Côte d`Ivoire, although they continue to support the NPFL, were increasingly concerned about Taylor`s persistent deficit in the peace process. Thus, the NPFL decided to appease its two great supporters by appearing reasonable – by agreeing to serve in the transitional government. At the same time, the NPFL continued to play its role as a spoiler. What is important is that the NPFL`s half-approach has made it more difficult for ECOWAS, even though the organization had the political will, to force the Taylor-led militia to end its continued practice of undermining the peace process. On 21 December 1994, the leaders of the NPFL, the UliMO and the remnants of the Liberian armed forces met in Accra, Ghana. Ghanaian President Rawlings chaired the meeting in his capacity as ECOWAS President. At the end of the meeting, the “new” peace agreement dealt with three main themes: first, the belligerents must feel fully engaged in the peace process, both in words and deeds. And the peacemaker should pay serious attention to it as a central element in assessing the overall characteristics of the parties to the conflict in a civil conflict.
The content of the agreement is obviously essential. These would cover issues such as power-sharing agreements, fear reduction methods and cost-raising provisions (Hampson, 1996; Stedman 1997; Géti 2007; Mattes and Savun 2009). Overall, there would be a way to move from war to peace, which consists of activities such as disarmament, demobilization and elections. The rivalry between the UN Observer Mission (UNOMIL) and ECOMOG has also contributed to the lack of commitment shown by the warring factions, in particular the NPFL, to the various post-Cotonou peace agreements. For example, although UNMIL and ECOMOG were both responsible for implementing security provisions under the Cotonou peace agreement, UNOMIL did not consult with ECOMOG, the main peacekeeping force, to set up surveillance sites and send observers across the country (Kieh 2009:51).
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